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ABSTRACT: 
We introduce a simulation model of the port of 
Calais with a focus on the operation of 
immigration controls. Our aim is to compare the 
cost and benefits of different screening policies. 
Methodologically, we are trying to understand 
the limits of discrete event simulation of rare 
events. When will they become “too rare” for 
simulation to give meaningful results? 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The trade offs between the costs of risk policies 
and costs of the potential disruptions are very 
important in every business (Kleindorfer and 
Saad (2005)). In the context of port security, 
while protecting against the threats, the interest of 
the port authorities is to keep the port 
performance as smooth as possible. Thus CBA of 
different policies is important. 
 
In port security, CBA is frequently discussed with 
regards to deciding policies for disastrous events, 
as for example terrorist attacks. However, as 
costs for such events often cannot be estimated, 
CBA analysis is limited (e.g. Bichou et al. (2009) 
and Jacobson et al. (2006)). A neglected  
application area for CBA is guiding policies for 
events that are relatively rare, but not disastrous, 
yet important to consider for planning 
investments in security, e.g. smuggling or illegal 
immigration. In this case, CBA promises to be 
more useful as compared to rare events where the 
cost often cannot be quantified. We shall call 
these situations “infrequent events”. 
 
In our research we want to show that CBA 
together with simulation is a useful tool for port 
authorities. Our hypothesis is that in addition to 
being more flexible and realistic than traditional 
CBA techniques such as decision trees, 
simulation will also allow us to better plan for 
infrequent events: Traditional CBA techniques 
are either based on mean outcomes or provide 
theoretic worst-case analysis. Simulation on the 
other hand allows us to look at a spread of 
outcomes over an appropriate number of 
replications, thus giving us a truer picture of the 
range of potential outcomes. 
 
We believe that simulation is most useful if the 
probability of infrequent events is between 
certain upper and lower bounds. If the probability 
is too high, decision trees might be more 
efficient. If too low, too many replications will be 
required to be feasible. Establishing such bounds 
for port security will be one goal of our research. 
 
In order to test this hypothesis, we conduct a case 
study at the ferry port of Calais where we look at 
illegal immigration attempts. We use simulation 
to estimate the likelihood of an illegal immigrant 
entering the country and CBA to evaluate 
different policies and estimate how much this 
cost the British taxpayer every year. Once our 
base model is in place we can then test different 
scenarios, to find out where to invest money. 
 
This research is still at a very early stage. With 
regards to the simulation part of the project, we 
have collected knowledge and data about the port 
operation in Calais and we have built a first draft 
of the simulation model. With regards to CBA we 
have implemented a comparable model as a 
decision tree, a technology used in CBA. 
 
In the remainder of the paper we will discuss 
about CBA and then present our case study site 
and operation in a bit more detail. Finally, we 
conclude and present our future work. 
2. BACKGROUND 
In security literature use of CBA is under 
discussion. Bichou et al. (2009) argue that 
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conducting CBA while dealing with security 
issues will be impossible, because of the 
difficulty to estimate the costs of unwanted 
events. While Jacobson et al. (2006) propose 
using of CBA and simulation. In addition the 
authors suggest a cost benefit model that includes 
direct (e.g. operational costs) and indirect costs 
(e.g. false negatives). However, Jacobson et al. 
(2006) do not use the indirect cost component in 
their case study. Their argument is that while 
dealing with rare events it is very difficult to 
estimate the consequences. 
 
Bjorkholm and Boeh (2006) suggest estimating 
the costs of cargo screening with x-ray machines 
and recommend better utilisation of this 
technology by using economic analysis. 
According to the authors there are three main 
reasons for screening: duties and taxes, illicit 
materials and external threats. The authors find 
that in first two cases economic analyses are 
possible while in the third case there is no 
agreement about the estimated costs. 
 
Willis and La Tourrette (2008) use break even 
analysis in combination with limited simulation 
to estimate the benefits of a prevention of a 
terrorist attack. However, they agree that there 
are no complete reliable estimates. In addition the 
authors argue that using CBA for terrorism 
threats has multiple obstacles which sources are 
in: “uncertainty in terrorist risk level” and “very 
low recurrence interval for large attacks”. 
 
Farrow and Shapiro (2009) also suggest using 
break even analysis. According to the authors 
those analysis are implicit while CBA are 
explicit. Moreover, they argue that “with 
infrequent occurrences of some (not all) security 
events there will be an element of subjective or 
assumed probabilistic structure even in explicit 
models”. 
 
Another approach to ensure efficiency in the 
security investments is Markowitz theory of 
portfolio selection (1952). Talas and Menachof 
(2009) suggest using Markowitz’s approach and 
build a conceptual model that helps to identify the 
efficiency of the security measures deployed. 
 
Simulation has been used outside logistics to 
conduct CBA, e.g. in cancer screening research. 
Habbema et al. (1987), for example, use 
simulation and argue that CBA is an appropriate 
technique to compare two different cancer 
screening policies. The authors use a micro 
simulation approach for exploring different 
scenarios and their outputs. Similar to Habbema 
et al., Pilgrim et al. (2009) suggest conducting a 
cost effectiveness analysis for cancer screening 
policies while using discrete event simulation. 
These authors support their choice of 
methodology by previous research with the same 
research strategy. 
3. CASE STUDY 
In order to achieve our research as explained 
above, we have chosen to use a case study data 
collection approach. Calais has been chosen as 
our first case study for the following reasons: the 
number of links – Calais operates only with 
Dover; the simplicity of the cargo flow, only one 
particular threat of interest to the British 
government (clandestines). Clandestines are 
people who are trying to enter the UK illegally – 
without having proper papers and documents. In 
this case study the infrequent event is the 
probability to detect a lorry with additional 
freight on board. The cost of a clandestine to the 
UK per one year is £20,000 (UK Border Agency 
2008). 
 
Between April 2007 and April 2008 the 
throughput of lorries that passed screening 
facilities in Calais was greater than 900,000. 
Approximately, 0.4% of these lorries had 
additional human freight on board (UK Border 
Agency 2008). The number of undetected 
clandestines is unknown. Also very little is 
known about efficiency of the technology which 
is used. Some manufacturers have benchmarks 
but the benchmarks are according to an 
experimental environment rather than to a real 
world environment. It is very rare to find 
unbiased benchmarks that were made according 
to the real world. 
 
The port is divided into two main parts: French 
and British control. Sensors are used on its 
perimeter: PMMW (passive millimetres waves) 
similar to x-ray machines; HB (heart beat 
detector) used to detect movements in the body of 
the lorry itself; CO2 probe used to identify the 
level of oxygen inside the lorry; canine teams, 
and visual inspections. All the detectors listed 
above are in use by both French and British 
authorities, except for PMMW, which is in use 
only on the French side of Calais. Both 
authorities sort the lorries according to type (hard 
and soft sided). Generally, the PMMW detector is 
used for soft sided lorries, while HB detector is 
used for hard sided lorries. All other detection 
tools can be utilised for both types of the lorries. 
 
For our case study we have built a decision tree 
that fully represents the flow inside our system. 
In addition we built a discrete event simulation 
model of the system by using AnyLogic software 
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(XJ Technologies 2010), building both allows us 
to check the results and validate the model. 
 
The basic simulation model represents the 
decision tree as closely as possible. However our 
simulation in comparison with the decision tree 
has an advantage of randomness (e.g. slightly 
different number of arrivals each time). We made 
ten replications of this basic model and calculated 
the average to compare its results with the results 
of the decision tree. In addition we changed the 
probability of a lorry being checked on the British 
side between 0% and 100% and compared the 
results with the results of the decision tree. We 
found that the simulation results (average of 10 
replications) and the decision tree results are very 
similar, thus validating our simulation model. 
 
 
Figure 1: The Conceptual Model of Calais Port 
4. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
We think that CBA should not be ignored as a 
useful research tool in risk assessment. Currently 
we investigate different scenarios for our 
simulation model, e.g. exceeding queue capacities 
and adding peak and off peak times to the system. 
Following this, we will try to establish bounds for 
the probability of infrequent events versus the 
usefulness of simulation for CBA. Finally, we 
intend to apply our methodology to a second case 
study, the port of Dover. 
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